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Towards a Collective Regulatory System of Private Equity Funds in China: Legislative 
Progress and Political Challenges 
Chi Zhang* 
 
Abstract 
 
Private equity investment funds have been playing an increasingly significant role in the 
Chinese economy. Owing to the fragmented financial regulatory regime of the country, 
however, both the official supervision and self-regulation of private equity funds in China are 
still problematic, which has increased the potential risk in the market. This article investigates 
the political logic of the ongoing legislative and regulatory reform of private equity funds in 
China. It also explores a proposal for the legal reform of the Chinese private equity industry 
with reference to the experience of the United Kingdom and the European Union. It is 
suggested that a unified financial regulatory system as a fundamental institutional arrangement 
is a pre-requisite for establishing an effective and efficient regulatory regime for private equity 
funds in China. This can only be achieved when the political conflict between different 
regulators in the Chinese bureaucratic system is removed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Ever since the global financial crisis in 2008, it has been widely accepted that external 
protection of investors in private equity1 funds is indispensable and it has also been proven that 
excessive regulatory exemption of private investment funds, including PE funds, may lead to 
serious market risk.2 Chinese regulators have recently emphasized the need for enhancing both 
the official and industry regulation of the PE industry. The supreme authority of the country 
was made particularly aware of and appreciates the more industry-oriented proposal for 
financial reform proposed by the Fifth National Conference for Financial Reform held by the 
State Council of China from 14 to 15 July 2017.3 This implies that direct investment in Chinese 
industry companies will be encouraged more than financial trading in the secondary markets. 
Against this social background, the development of the legal and regulatory systems of PE 
funds in China is being promoted significantly. 
  
In China, the regulatory system of the PE industry currently comprises two forms: (i) official 
regulation and (ii) self-regulation. The securities investment fund industry of China  underwent 
comprehensive regulatory reform during 2012–2014, resulting in a new regulatory model for 
PE funds. However, owing to the political and departmental interests of different regulators, 
the effectiveness of such regulatory approach is problematic. On the one hand, a functional 
regulatory system has not yet been established in China and different regulatory bodies operate 
official regulation over private investment funds. Thus, the compliance cost is very high. On 
the other hand, although a self-regulatory system of PE has been established in China, however, 
due to the inadequate reputational mechanism in the market, further reform of the self-
regulation of PE funds is also necessary. 
 
                                                 
1 Hereinafter referred to as ‘PE’. 
2  US Department of the Treasury, ‘Agreement Among PWG and US Agency Principals on Principles and 
Guidelines regarding Privet Pool of Capital’ (Feb 2007), < https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin- 
mkts/Documents/hp272_principles.pdf > accessed 19 June 2017; Financial Services Authority, Private Equity: A 
Discussion of Risk and Regulatory Engagement (Discussion Paper 06/6, 2006). 
3 Zhifeng Xu, Qiuyu Wu and Jie Ouyang, A Comprehensive Report of the Fifth National Conference of 
Financial Reform (16 July 2017), < http://finance.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0716/c1004-29407471.html> accessed 
19 July 2017. 
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This article reflects the research conducted into the political pattern in the development path 
of the official regulatory and self-regulatory systems of the Chinese PE industry, which 
revealed the detail of the existing problems in this field and their political roots. This article 
is organized as follows:  
 
Firstly, the risk of the Chinese PE industry is overviewed in a general sense. The section that 
follows sheds light on the recent legal and regulatory reforms of the Chinese investment fund 
industry and the substantive influence on the Chinese PE industry is discussed. The landscape 
of the self-regulatory system of PE funds in China is sketched and the drawbacks are analysed. 
In order to provide a reasonable reform proposal for the Chinese PE industry, the regulatory 
regimes of PE in the United Kingdom (UK) and European Union (EU) respectively are 
examined. A possible reform directive for Chinese PE funds is proposed and its limitation in 
the light of the political issues in the country is reviewed. In the concluding section, the 
suggestion is made that although the ongoing reform of a collective and unified regulatory 
regime of PE in China is greatly encouraged, its substantial progress and effectiveness, 
however, still depend on the political compromise and co-operation between the different 
regulatory bodies in the Chinese government.  
 
2. The Risk in the Chinese Private Equity Investment 
 
Private equity as one of the most mysterious sectors of the global financial market is 
continually making huge profits in mysterious ways. However, the fact that PE investment is 
highly risky is often ignored. Briefly, regulators have identified the following risks in PE 
funds: first, the excessive leverage used by PE funds may be a severe burden on PE-owned 
companies, which may give rise to a series of public problems, including corporate distress 
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and massive layoff.4 Second, owing to the long-term lockup period of PE funds, lenders will 
be motivated to transfer their exposure to other market participants by means of, for example, 
credit derivatives, which means that the unregulated financing activities of PE funds may also 
significantly spread the risk to the public. In this regard, the lesson learnt from the global 
financial crisis in 2008 has shown that the over-use of credit derivatives can make it hard to 
identify and judge the ownership of the risk of underlying assets.5 As a consequence, default 
events of some individual transactions may result in the fall of the market. Third, the 
exemption of the disclosure requirement of PE funds may also harm PE investors: the 
asymmetry of information between the fund managers and investors can be serious. Hence, it 
is quite difficult for PE investors to monitor fund managers’ investment decisions effectively.6 
 
In terms of the Chinese markets, the PE investment is more risky and immature than the PE 
markets in developed countries. The main legal issues in relation to the Chinese PE market can 
be summarized as follows: first of all, the limited partnership (LP) structure is the primary but 
not the only organizational structure of PE funds in China. In fact, there are ten percent around 
of the PE funds in China are established as business trusts.7  From a functional perspective, 
however, both of the trust and LP-structured PE funds play the same function in the Chinese 
economy, the lack of collective regulatory system has given rise to the waste of social 
resources. The PE funds organized in the form of investment trust presently are exclusively 
regulated by the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission 8 , the limited 
partnership funds, however, fall in the regulatory scope of the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission9.  Therefore, the regulatory systems of the two regulatory bodies, for instance, the 
market entry policies, transparency rules and internal governance rules are quite different from 
each other and the severe regulatory arbitrage remarkably increase transaction cost of PE 
                                                 
4 Financial Services Authority, Private Equity: A Discussion of Risk and Regulatory Engagement (Discussion 
Paper 06/6, 2006) 89–90. 
5 Ibid., at 90. 
6 Iain G. MacNeil, Private Equity: The UK Regulatory Response 3 Capital Markets Law Journal 18, 22 (2008). 
7 Zhi Zheng, Wentao Wang, Decoding the Trusts, 294 (Citic Press 2014). 
8 Hereinafter referred to as ‘CBIRC’. 
9 Hereinafter referred to as ‘CSRC’. 
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practitioners10.  Secondly, the PE limited partnership funds were not regulated by a specialized 
regulator, therefore, the regulatory strategies are not really reasonable nor efficient.   
 
In a nutshell, the professionalization and unification of the PE regulation in China are both 
necessary and important. The current wave of regulatory reform of the Chinese PE industry 
that started from 2012 mainly focuses on establishing a collective regulatory system of PE 
funds, however, the complex political conflicts of the financial regulators is the focal point in 
the reform. 
 
3. Contending for the Regulatory Power of Private Equity in China: The National 
Development and Reform Committee versus China Securities Regulatory 
Committee  
 
Basically, the official regulatory system of PE funds in China is structured on two levels: (i) 
the regulation of venture capital funds led by the National Development and Reform 
Committee11 and (ii) the general regulatory system of private investment funds controlled by 
the CSRC.  Nonetheless, owing to the political conflict between the NDRC and CSRC in 
financial regulation, the Chinese regulatory regime of the private equity industry actually fails 
to protect the economic interests of fund investors effectively. Fortunately, reform of the 
regulation over PE funds was launched in 2012 and further reform is expected.  
 
Before discussing the implementation of the regulatory power, the legal status of the NDRC 
within China’s economic and political regimes should be considered briefly. The predecessor 
of the NDRC was the National Planning Commission,12 which was established in 1952. The 
main functions of the NPC were (i) to create macro-economic policy for different industries 
and (ii) to supervise the implementation of Chinese government’s national economic plans at 
all the levels. From a legal perspective, before the institutional reform of the Chinese economy 
was launched in the late 1970s, the legal status of the NPC was such that it was, in effect, the 
                                                 
10 The details of the CBIRC’s regulatory framework of private equity investment trusts are available in: Chi Zhang, 
Venture Capital Investment Trusts in China: Legal Framework, Challenges, and Reform 23 (7) Trusts & Trustees 
806 (2017). 
11 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘NDRC’ 
12 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘NPC’. 
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most powerful department of the State Council of China. Almost any proposed economic or 
industrial activities (e.g., industrial planning, foreign investment, price control, financial 
activities and infrastructure) had to be approved by the NPC; in other words, historically, the 
nature of the NPC was that of an extremely general social administrative body but not a 
professional regulator of specific economic activities. With the liberalization of the economy, 
however, the over-broad administrative power of the NDRC has been a barrier to Chinese 
economic reform. To reduce administrative intervention in the market economy, two waves of 
reform of the NPC led by the State Council were launched in 1998 and 2003 respectively.13 At 
present a series of the most substantive approval powers associated with financial regulation 
are still in the hands of the NDRC. Accordingly, the NDRC’s regulation over the PE industry 
is also not specialized and the protection of investors is also insufficient. 
 
Since the promulgation of the Interim Provisions for the Administration of Start-up Investment 
Enterprises (2005),14 the domestic PE funds in China have been regulated by the NDRC15 
which obtains the power to examine and supervise the operation of PE funds at any time. In 
the situation where a PE firm does not comply with the law, the NDRC has the power to revoke 
its licence.16 However, the Interim Provision (2005) does not clarify any legal liability or 
substantive punishment imposed on fund managers who display inappropriate behaviour. In 
such a loose policy circumstance, many unqualified fund management firms were motivated to 
raise funds from unqualified investors and invested in risky projects.17 
 
                                                 
13 During the 2000s, the State Council of China cancelled or simplified 2,614 administrative approvals and the 
further simplification of the administrative approval power of the NDRC was proposed. For more detail, see 
Youliang Yan, ‘A Leviathan? The NDRC is Being Powerful Again’ Sina Finance News (Beijing, 30 May 2013). 
<http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20130530/082015636012.shtml> accessed 22 April 2017. 
14 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Interim Provisions (2005)’. 
15 According to the Interim Provisions (2005), all PE and VC funds shall be filed with the NDRC or other 
related administrative departments of the provinces (s 4) and registered with the State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce (SAIC) or local departments of the SAIC (s 8). 
16 Section 27, the Interim Provisions (2005). 
17 For instance, the so-called First Judicial Case of China’s PE Funds was adjudicated by the First Intermediate 
People’s Court of Shanghai in 2010, in which a twenty-eight-year-old fund manager, Hao Huang, was accused of 
fraud in the financing industry and finally sentenced to fifteen years in prison. In this case, Hao Huang the general 
partner of the PE funds, raised around RMB 0.178 billion from as many as 720 natural persons in China. This 
kind of unregulated PE scandal has been more common since China’s Alternative Investment Market was 
launched in October of 2010. Yonggang Liu, ‘The First Private Equity Case in China: A Chinese Ponzi Scheme?’ 
China Economy Weekly (Beijing, 29 June 2010) <http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/12001069.html> accessed 23 
April 2017. 
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However, the CSRC has been actively competing with the NDRC in regulating PE funds since 
2012. The revision of the Securities Investment Fund Law of China was completed by the end 
of December 2012. One of the key debates in the process of amending this legislation was 
whether PE funds should be officially regulated by the Securities Investment Fund Law of 
China (2012 Revision).18 
 
According to the first version of the Consultation Draft issued by the Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress,19 the new law tries to regulate PE funds formed as limited 
liability companies or limited partnerships.20 It is evident that if this Consultation Draft can be 
successfully enacted into a statute, the regulator of PE funds will be changed, which means that 
the CSRC and courts will be able substantially to share the regulatory power over PE funds. 
More importantly, because the legal status of statutes issued by the National People’s Congress 
enjoys top priority in the Chinese legislative system, both the legal force of the Provisions 
(2005) and the NDRC’s regulatory authority of PE may be ended in the short term.21 As a 
result, the NDRC was dissatisfied with this Consultation Draft. In the process of the second 
and final rounds of discussion on revising the SIFL, as a consequence, the NDRC and the 
twenty-five professional associations in the PE industry across the country jointly signed a 
statement addressed to the SCNPC, arguing that the high-level regulation over PE funds would 
cripple the development of the Chinese PE industry. 22  As a result of the departmental 
                                                 
18 Hereinafter referred to as ‘SIFL’. 
19 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘SCNPC’. 
20 In this early version of the Consultation Draft (July 2012), private investment funds (excluding investment trusts 
which have been regulated by the CBIRC since 2007) was proposed to be regulated by the CSRC, according to 
Arts 106 and 107 of the Consultation Draft, the investment funds whose fund managers shall bear unlimited 
liability will be regulated by the law and the content of the term ‘securities’ includes all the stocks, bonds and any 
other types of financial derivatives that can legally be exchanged or circulated in China. This means that the equity 
of private companies that can be transacted privately is also expected to be regulated by the revised SIFL; in other 
words, not only public investment funds, but also privately raised investment funds, including hedge funds, PE 
and VC funds, will also be regulated by the new SIFL. The official version of this interim legislative document is 
available at: 
 http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/lfgz/flca/2012-07/06/content_1729072.htm. 
21  Clifford Chance LLP, ‘The Amended Securities Investment Funds Law’: Significant Changes but More 
Expected’ (25 January 2013) 
<http://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2013/01/the_amended_securitiesinvestmentfundslaw.html > accessed 
28 April 2017; Dongying Wang, ‘The Regulatory Power of PE/VC Funds: NDRC PK CSRC’, South Weekly 
(2013) <http://www.nbweekly.com/news/business/201306/33414.aspx > accessed 28 April 2017. 
22 Supra note, Dongying Wang; Dong Liu, ‘The New Law of Securities Investment Funds: Private Equity and 
Venture Capital Funds Are Still Free from Regulation’ China Business News (Beijing, 25 December 2012) < 
http://finance.people.com.cn/fund/n/2012/1225/c201329-20003436.html> accessed 17 April 2017; Sha Xiao, 
‘The Rent-seeking Behind the Legislative Activities Regarding Private Equity Funds: The Intense Competition 
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competition in the jurisdiction in the final revision of SIFL (2012 Revision), PE funds were 
eventually excluded from the regulatory ambit of SIFL (2012 Revision).23 
 
In the above circumstances, driven by the competition between the NDRC and CSRC, further 
regulatory reform of China’s PE funds continued. In June 2013, the State Commission Office 
for the Public Sector Reform of China24 clarified the division of powers in the PE regulatory 
affairs between the NDRC and CSRC as follows: (i) the NDRC should be in charge of making 
macro-industry policies for the development of PE funds, and coordinate the relationship 
between the government and PE market; and (ii) the CSRC should be responsible for the 
regulation of PE firms and the protection of PE investors.25 Based on this administrative order, 
the most important regulatory reform of PE funds went further in 2014. On the one hand, the 
NDRC has stated that the annual review of PE funds with the NDRC was no longer required.26 
On the other hand, more importantly, the Interim Measures for the Supervision and 
Administration of Privately Raised Investment Funds (2014), 27 which is the first detailed 
administrative regulation of PE funds issued by the CSRC, came into force in August of the 
same year. 
 
According to the Interim Measures (2014), the CSRC is the general regulator of all kinds of 
private investment funds in China with the exception of investment trust funds, which are 
regulated by the China Banking Regulatory CommissionCBIRC. 28  However, because the 
                                                 
Between Administrative Departments’ The Rule of Law Weekends (Beijing, 22 August 2012) 
<http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/smjj/20120822/153112922035.shtml> accessed 17 April 2017. 
23 The material compromising the final version of the law is reflected in Art. 95 of the SIFL (2012 Revision): the 
term securities therein refers to any publicly issued stocks, bonds and any other types of financial derivatives that 
can legally be exchanged or circulated in China. It is evident that the adjustment of the definitive scope of 
‘securities’ through the legislative procedure of the law makes PE funds free from the CSRC’s high level of 
regulation <http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Gid=191978> accessed 10 May 2017. 
24 Hereinafter referred to as ‘SCOPSR’. 
25 The Notice of the Division of Regulatory Functions Regarding Private Equity Funds issued by SCOPSR, June 
2013 < http://www.scopsr.gov.cn/bbyw/qwfb/201306/t20130627_227855.html> accessed 10 June 2017. 
26 The Notice of the Issues Regarding Further Development of Venture Capital Investment Enterprises issued by 
the General Office of NDRC (May 2014) http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/201405/t20140514_611509.html> 
accessed 10 June 2017. 
27 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Interim Measures (2014)’. CSRC, Interim Measures for the Supervision and 
Administration of Privately Raised Investment Funds (2014)  
< http://www.amac.org.cn/cms/article/preview?ID=386993> accessed 10 June 2017. 
28 According to s 2 of the Interim Measures (2014), the assets of a ‘private investment fund’ includes, but is not 
limited to, stocks, equities, bonds, futures, options and fund units, in consideration of the separated financial 
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administrative hierarchy of the NDRC and CSRC is at the same level and the Provisions (2005) 
are still legally valid, currently any PE funds registered in China have to comply with the 
requirements issued by the two regulators, namely (i) the CSRC and (ii) NDRC. Obviously, 
such a dual-level regulatory system has reduced the efficiency and unnecessarily increased PE 
practitioners’ compliance costs. Further regulatory reform of PE funds is expected to simplify 
the compliance requirement of PE funds reasonably by enhancing the CSRC’s regulatory 
power in the PE market and, finally, remove the unprofessional regulatory power of the NDRC.  
 
4. Industry Self-regulation of Private Equity Funds in China: Unification in Process 
 
The above analysis indicates that due to the lack of a coherent and unified regulatory system 
of PE funds in China, the enforceability of the law and the effectiveness of the protection of 
investors in PE funds are unsatisfactory. Although a collective regulatory system of the 
investment fund industry is being built up, in order to enhance investor protection and to 
promote market practice of PE in China, the self-regulatory system of the PE industry is also 
important. 
 
Generally speaking, the self-regulatory system of PE in China is organized on both the national 
and provisional levels. One the one hand, pursuant to the Interim Measures (2014), the Asset 
Management Association of China,29 founded and led by the CSRC in June 2012, is the unified 
self-regulatory body of private investment funds with a nationwide scope. 30  As a self-
regulatory body in the financial market, the primary function of the AMAC is improving 
information transparency and normalising the managerial conduct of the Chinese asset 
management industry. As a subset of private investment funds, PE funds are also required to 
register with the AMAC, which means that any violation of laws or regulations by the fund 
manager (mostly general partners) or individual practitioners may be punished by the AMAC. 
At present, the AMAC has developed a system of information sharing on its official website 
                                                 
regulatory system, investment trusts that are exclusively regulated by the CBIRC are excluded from the regulatory 
scope of the Interim Measures (2014). 
29 Hereinafter referred to as ‘AMAC’. 
30 It is provided in Chapter 6 of the Interim Measures (2014) that ‘AMAC is obliged to make self-regulatory rules 
and examine the performance of its member institutions and related practitioners (s 29); in the circumstance where 
any member institutions or related practitioners violate the laws, administrative regulations or self-regulatory 
rules, AMAC is entitled to take actions and publish the violations to the public via its website (s 29); AMAC shall 
establish a complaint-handling mechanism to accept investor complaints and mediate disputes (s 30).’ 
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where the public can directly access all information on violations, punishment, and blacklisting 
of members and individuals who have failed to comply with the laws, regulations or self-
regulatory rules.31 
 
On the other hand, the industry associations of PE supervised and led by the NDRC also play 
a role in self-regulating Chinese PE funds. By the end of March 2017, there were two main 
national-level self-regulators32 and twenty-two local-level self-regulators of the PE industry in 
China. 33  Most of these industry associations serve as information-sharing platforms for 
investors and financial regulators. In terms of the self-regulation, it is obvious that a single and 
separated reputational mechanism of self-regulation is insufficient for protecting PE investors. 
For example, most articles of association of the industry regulatory bodies only provide that in 
the circumstances where a member violates the law or the articles of association, the association 
may permanently revoke the membership of the non-compliant member.34 In most cases, the 
PE associations are reluctant to expose any illegal, inappropriate or immoral behaviour of their 
members; in other words, the reputational deterrence of the members of PE associations is still 
weak. 
 
Although the two nation-wide self-regulatory bodies of the Chinese PE and VC industries were 
founded in 2001 and 2002 respectively, the standardization of industry-wide self-regulation is 
imperfect; for instance, the China Association of Private Equity 35  released the Principle 
                                                 
31 Up to March 2017, AAMAC has blacklisted four fund management firms and five individuals who failed to 
comply with the laws, regulations and self-regulatory rules <http://www.amac.org.cn/xxgs/hmd/> accessed 
15 June 2017.  
32 China Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (CVCA) and China Association of Private Equity 
(CAPE). 
33 The following provinces have established their local self-regulatory associations of the PE and VC industry: 
Hunan Province, Hubei Province, Henan Province, Guangdong Province, Zhejiang Province, Shanxi Province, 
Jiangsu Province, Anhui Province, Jilin Province, Sichuan Province, Yunnan Province, Liaoning Province, Inner 
Mongolia Province and Fujian Province. The following big cities have also established local associations for PE 
or VC: Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Chongqing, Suzhou and Haerbin. Moreover, Beijing established 
ZhongGuanCun Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (ZPEVCA) in 2013. Shanghai also established a 
special professional association, namely the Shanghai Private Equity Association (SHPEA) in 2004, the goal of 
which is to enhance collaboration with international PE firms. 
34 For instance, s 13 of the Articles of Association of Suzhou Association of Private Equity 
<http://www.szape.org/CompanyConstitution.aspx> accessed 17 June 2017; s 12 of the Articles of Association 
of Beijing Association of Private Equity < http://www.bpea.net.cn/article/ljxh/xhzc/> accessed 17 June 2017. 
35 Hereinafter referred to as ‘CAPE’. 
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Guidelines for China’s PE and VC industry36 in November 2011, which is regarded as an 
official standard of the Chinese PE and VC industry. However, this guideline only provides a 
series of very general principles regarding the self-regulatory issues, without detailed and 
practical rules. It is evident that an effective reputational mechanism of the market may hardly 
be established in this way. 
 
5. International Experience: The Collective Regulation of Private Equity in the 
United Kingdom and European Union 
 
5.1 The Regulatory Regime of Private Equity Funds in the United Kingdom: A Market-
Based Model 
 
In the existing financial regulatory framework of the UK, PE and VC funds as unauthorized 
investment funds are unregulated by the Financial Conduct Authority.37 In consideration of its 
risky nature, especially the excessive leverage used by PE funds, however, the FCA is also 
inclined to emphasise the regulation of the conduct of PE firms in the UK market.38 However, 
most of such requirements have been satisfied by the existing corporate law and takeover 
rules; 39  that is, the official regulatory regime of the PE industry mostly focuses on the 
application of the existing laws regarding business organizations,40 as in most cases private 
equity funds are involved in corporate governance issues by exercising their voting right as 
shareholders of investee companies, but less directly influence public markets. 
 
By contrast, the industry association of PE and VC in the UK has moved much more quickly 
in this area. The British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association,41 which has been the 
                                                 
36 China Association of Private Equity (CAPE), ‘The Principle Guidelines for China’s Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Industry’ (2011) <http://files.cbex.com.cn/bpea/201111/20111111133220846.pdf> accessed 18 June 
2017. 
37 Hereinafter referred to as ‘FCA’. 
38 For example, before Brexit is completed, the authorization and on-going information transparency of PE firms 
in the UK are required as a compliance of Alternative Investment Fund Manager Directive of the EU which will 
be discussed in the following subsection. 
39 These mostly refer to the Companies Act 2006 and the Takeover Code of the City. 
40 For instance, investor protection for limited partners in PE funds is subject to the provisions under the Limited 
Partnership Act 1907, the restriction on the conduct of PE funds as shareholders in corporate governance is subject 
to the provisions under the Companies Act 2006 and the constraints on those buyout funds as bidders lie within 
the regulatory remit of the Listing Rules of London Stock Exchange and the Takeover Codes of the City of 
London. 
41 Hereinafter referred to as ‘BVCA’. 
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leading self-regulatory body of PE and VC funds in the UK, was established in 1983. Its 
membership comprises over 500 influential firms, including VC firms, professional 
consultancies and international associations.42 The primary mission of the BVCA is to promote 
integrity and transparency in the UK’s PE and VC market, and to enhance communication 
between members internationally. In response to the public disquiet over the PE industry after 
the global financial crisis, the BVCA has been playing an increasingly important role in 
mitigating the risks in PE transactions. In terms of the regulatory functions of the BVCA, the 
Regulatory Committee of the BVCA plays an important role in the self-regulation of PE and 
VC firms in the UK, whose responsibility it is to ensure that all members can keep abreast of 
any changes of the regulatory and policy environment in a timely manner. 43  In order to 
guarantee the consistency between the practices of the PE and VC practitioners and authorities, 
regularly publishing consulting research reports for the regulators or policymakers is another 
key function of the Regulatory Committee of the BVCA.44 
 
In November 2007, under the leadership of Sir George Walker, the Guidelines for Disclosure 
and Transparency in Private Equity 45  were published which outlined the self-regulatory 
approach of PE funds in the UK. In the first place, PE and VC firms should timeously publish 
the details of their (i) investment strategies; and (ii) background of professional staff; and (iii) 
a description of UK portfolio companies in the portfolio of PE firms on their website, which 
should be accessible to the public and investors.46 PE firms are also obliged to report on the 
records of the investment of their portfolios to the association, by which the BVCA is able to 
assess the performance of each PE firm both on an annual and industry-wide basis.47 In the 
second place, portfolio companies are required to disclose the composition of their board, 
including the representatives of the PE firms on the board,48 which is in support of mitigating 
the information asymmetry between general partners and limited partners. In order to keep the 
flexibility and adaptability of the soft law regulatory system, the BVCA tends to regulate the 
                                                 
42 See the official website of the BVCA: http://www.bvca.co.uk/AboutUs.aspx.  
43 See the official website of the BVCA: 
http://www.bvca.co.uk/AboutUs/CouncilCommitteesAdvisoryGroups/RegulatoryCommittee.aspx.  
44 Ibid.  
45 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Walker Guidelines (2007)’. BVCA, Guidelines for Disclosure and Transparency 
in Private Equity (November 2007)  
<http://walker-gmg.co.uk/sites/10051/files/wwg_report_final.pdf> accessed 21 May 2017. 
46 Ibid., at 26. 
47 Ibid., at 27. 
48 Ibid., at 24. 
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PE funds on a ‘comply or explain’ basis, which means that the PE or VC firms who do not 
comply with the above rules must provide the BVCA with an acceptable and reasonable 
statement.49 
 
After the publication of the Walker Guidelines 2007, the Guidelines Monitoring Group50 was 
established as an independent monitoring committee. The main task of the GMG is to 
implement the rules in the UK PE market effectively. In practical terms, the effectiveness of 
the self-regulation by the BVCA mainly works on the basis of a market reputation mechanism; 
for instance, the GMG annually publishes a Review of Conformity with the guidelines that will 
name the non-compliers for the public. In this scenario, both the limited partners and any other 
parties in the PE market can directly judge the reputation of the non-complying firms;51 in other 
words, this market reputation deterrence can provide incentives for the PE management 
corporations who are covered by the Walker Guidelines 2007 to comply with the requirements 
of disclosure and transparency in the PE market. 
 
5.2 The Regulatory System of the Private Equity Firms as Fund Managers in the 
European Union: An Interventionist Model 
 
As a response to the 2008 global crisis, in June 2011, the parliament of the EU promulgated a 
unified regulation on alternative investment funds, namely the Alternative Investment Fund 
Managers and Amending Directives.52 Most private investment funds, including PE funds, fall 
within the regulatory scope of the AIFMD. In comparison with the regulatory system of PE 
funds in the UK, the regulatory strategy of the EU focuses more on the conduct of the fund 
managers of PE funds, as the definition or legal nature of the so-called investment fund may 
vary from country to country. Instead, a relatively unified definition of fund manager may be 
                                                 
49 Hereinafter referred to as ‘GMG’. Joseph A. McCahery and Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Private Equity Regulation: 
A Comparative Analysis 16 Journal of Management & Governance 197, 222 (2012). 
50 MacNeil (n 6) at 30. 
51 According to the Review of Conformity with the Guidelines 2014, two PE firms, namely Camelot (Ontario 
Teachers’ Pension Plan) and Viridian Group (Arcapita) who failed to comply with the requirement of the Walker 
Guidelines (2007) have been disclosed. Guidelines Monitoring Group, Seventeenth Report, December 2014, 24. 
52 The full name of the regulation is ‘Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives (2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC 
and Regulations (EC) No. 1060/2009 and (EU) No. 1095/2010), hereinafter referred to as the ‘AIFMD’. 
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easier to understand for all the EU member states. The following detailed requirements under 
the AIFMD regime are closely related to the regulation of PE fund managers in the EU: 
 
First, fund managers are obliged to disclose detailed information in relation to the PE funds, 
including, but not limited to, a list of shareholders of the Alternative Investment Fund 
Managers,53 organizational structure of the funds, the information in relation to the persons 
who are responsible for the fund management.54 In addition, the AIFMs of all the member 
states of the EU are also required to provide information on the funds as regards the (i) rate and 
sources of leverage; (ii) fundamental strategies of investment; (iii) decision-making procedure 
of altering the investment strategies; (iv) detailed description of conflicts of interest; and the 
(v) valuation of underlying assets of the funds and other information of potential risk.55 It can 
be seen that under the EU regulatory regime, the disclosure and transparency of portfolio 
managers are clarified in detail, which will facilitate the regulator with supervising the level of 
risk of the macro market in real time. Transparency is particularly significant for the PE 
industry, as the most PE funds involving leveraged buyouts 56  may generate high risk 
throughout the chain of debt, which may eventually give rise to systematic crises in financial 
markets. The existing EU regulator is making a particular effort to deal with information 
asymmetry and to improve the coherence in the unified financial market of the EU. 
 
Second, in terms of fund management, the AIFMD requires that all fund managers have 
responsibility to ensure that the internal control mechanism of the fund, such as accounting 
procedures and electronic technology system, is adequate to identify, trace and control the 
records of the transactions by its employees throughout the entire process of investment.57 
More importantly, in order to manage and measure the risk in leveraged investment effectively, 
the AIFMD especially requires fund managers to (i) set a maximum level of leverage and (ii) 
restrict the use of collateral and guaranties in portfolio investment, among other things.58  
 
                                                 
53 Hereinafter referred to as ‘AIFM.’ 
54 Art. 7 of the AIFMD. 
55 Arts 7 and 23 of the AIFMD. 
56 Hereinafter referred to as ‘LBOs’. 
57 Art. 18 of the AIFMD. 
58 Art. 15 of the AIFMD. 
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For those fund managers of specific types of alternative investment funds that may directly 
control the corporate governance of target companies, the AIFMD imposes particular 
restrictions on their conduct; for instance, the fund managers of those alternative investment 
funds that acquire control of unlisted companies by exercising their voting rights are obliged 
to comply with a series of special requirements: (i) standardized calculation methods of the 
voting rights attached to the shares held by the funds; (ii) timely notification of the acquisition 
of major holdings and control of non-listed companies; (iii) statutory annual report of 
exercising control of non-listed companies and (iv) strict restraints on asset stripping of target 
companies and so forth.59 Obviously, such investment funds mainly refer to private equity 
funds, especially those public-to-private buyouts vehicles (PTP funds). The AIFMD makes an 
effort to normalize management of the EU-registered PE funds and to protect the interest of 
not only shareholders, but also other stakeholders (such as the employees and creditors) of the 
investee companies. 
 
Compared to the relatively much looser regulatory environment of PE funds in the UK, the EU 
parliament intends to impose higher levels of obligation on the fund managers of alternative 
investment funds for the purpose of reducing systematic risk in the EU financial markets. One 
reasonable understanding of this difference is that there is much more inconsistency in 
domestic legislation in each of the EU member states than there is in the UK. Hence, a better 
approach to regulate PE or other alternative investment funds effectively is to clarify a shared 
standard of organizational management of the funds, instead of leaving too much leeway to the 
member states. It would otherwise be difficult to identify the risk of the funds and 
responsibilities of each fund manager across the EU. 
 
6. The Prospect of Private Equity Regulation in China: A Reform Proposal 
 
6.1 Developing a Unified and Practical Guideline for Private Equity Fund Managers 
 
As discussed above, the essential problem of the ineffective regulation of the Chinese PE 
market is rooted in the political conflicts of various administrative bodies. In March 2016, the 
State Council of China launched a specific reform proposal as regards the establishment of a 
                                                 
59 See details from Chap. V of the AIFMD. 
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collective regulatory regime of the entire financial market in China.60 In a general sense, it can 
be predicted that the supreme-level regulatory arrangements will gradually be establishing a 
comprehensive regulatory body aimed at identifying and controlling systematic risk in the 
entire Chinese financial market.61 This initiative by the central government of China can be 
regarded as a possible and feasible direction of the regulatory reform of the entire investment 
fund industry, including PE and VC, because the rapidly emerging industry of buyout funds in 
China has been increasing the risk of leverage in the Chinese financial market. 
 
In terms of the regulatory reform of PE funds, it is obvious that an effective and timely 
information-sharing mechanism across different sub-markets can facilitate the control of 
systematic risk in the PE industry. As a phased achievement of the reform, a collective 
regulatory regime that is uniformly led by the State Council is recommended as a proper way 
of improving the effectiveness of financial regulation. It has been recently proposed that a so-
called Central Committee of Financial Stability be established by the State Council, the core 
responsibility of which is to comprehensively and continually control the systematic risk in the 
Chinese financial markets, and also to coordinate with the People’s Bank of China, CSRC, 
CBIRC and China Insurance Regulatory Commission62 to enhance supervision of the conduct 
of market participants.63 In a macro sense, it is expected that the supervision of, and restriction 
on, over-risky transactions of Chinese PE funds could be improved in future. 
 
By contrast, in a micro sense, however, a unified and detailed practical guideline for the PE 
industry is still lacking. As already discussed, the existing Law of Securities Investment Funds 
(2012 Revision) has not yet covered PE funds. Private equity funds are only roughly regulated 
by the Interim Measures (2014). More formal and detailed legislation on all kinds of private 
investment funds in China is desired. Provisional improvement of the CSRC’s regulation is to 
encourage the CSRC to promulgate specific administrative rules as guidelines for PE 
practitioners. The existing regulations created by the NDRC may be advocated when the 
political interests and relationship of the CSRC and NDRC are well coordinated, by which PE 
                                                 
60 State Council of P. R. China, ‘The Opinion on the Significant Issues as regard Deepening Economic Reform of 
2016’ (31 March 2016). 
61 Lingyan Xu, Comparative Study on Legal System of Financial Supervision: Global Financial Legal System 
Reform and China’s Choice, 49–50 (Law Press 2016). 
62 Hereinafter referred to as ‘CIRC’. 
63 Supra note 3. 
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funds will be regulated more coherently and efficiently. The last step in the reform process is 
to revise the Law of Securities Investment Law of China and accept PE and VC funds as 
regulated objects. A longer period of regulatory practices of the CSRC may someday provide 
more insightful and useful experience for such a legislative reform. This is so because detailed 
legislation on private investment funds needs more knowledge and experience and not merely 
an indiscriminate legal transplant from other jurisdictions. 
 
6.2 Strengthening the Reputation Mechanism in the Chinese Private Equity Market 
 
With reference to the regulatory experience of the UK, it is recommended that the further 
reform of the industry regulation of the PE market in China should focus on the establishment 
of a nationwide reputation system, by which public investors can access information on any 
violations and immoral behaviour of fund managers and PE firms, as it has been proven and 
acknowledged that reputational records of PE firms have a remarkable correlation with not 
only the scale of fundraising,64 but also the bargaining ability of fund management firms.65  
 
Specifically, owing to the existence of the dual-level system of self-regulation, the functions 
of industry associations and the AMAC should be differentiated, by which the efficiency of 
self- regulation of PE funds can be improved. At a national level, the AMAC should play a 
leading role in the self-regulation of PE funds with a nationwide scope. According to sections 
7 and 8 of the Interim Measures (2014), all private investment funds are required to register 
with the AMAC and (i) file main legal documents, including the articles of associations, of 
corporate funds or limited partnership agreements, the basic information of senior managers;66 
(ii) disclose the key information of the investment targets and prospectus (if applicable).67 
                                                 
64 Ching-Yi Chang et al, Analysis of the Factors that Influence Venture Capital Fundraising: An Empirical Study 
in China 5 (12) African Journal of Business Management 4765 (2011). 
65 Lee Harris, A Critical Theory of Private Equity 35 (1) Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 1 (2010). 
66 Section 7 of the Interim Measures (2014) provides that: 
‘A manager of Privately-raised Funds of any type shall, in accordance with the provisions of the AMAC, apply 
for registration to the AMAC and submit the following basic materials: (1) Photocopies of the originals and 
duplicates of its industrial and commercial registration certificate and business license; (2) Its articles of 
association or partnership agreement; (3) The list of its major shareholders or partners; (4) Profiles of its senior 
management personnel; and (5) Other materials required by the AMAC.’ 
67 Section 8 of the Interim Measures (2014) provides that  
after the fund-raising of a Privately-raised Fund of any type is completed, the manager of the Privately-
raised Fund shall, in accordance with the provisions of the AMAC, go through the record-filing procedures 
for the Privately-raised Fund, and submit the following basic materials: (1) Information on the main 
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Therefore, AMAC is able to collect the substantive information of each PE fund and will be in 
the advantageous position of being able to identify the potential risk in the market, and judge 
the violations of laws and regulations or inappropriate behaviour of PE fund managers. 
 
At an industry level, the existing industry associations of PE and VC should play a more 
important role in boosting reputational pressure on fund managers and practitioners of the 
Chinese PE and VC market. First, it is advisable that a co-operation mechanism between the 
industry associations and AMAC be established, by means of which all information regarding 
the performance of industry associations’ members are accessible on websites or other public 
information platforms. In such a way, the reputational mechanism in the private investment 
fund market can be enhanced. Second, in a technical sense, more detailed and practical 
guidance such as model rules for profit distribution, the recommended practices of limited 
partnership agreements68 and the standards for judging the managing partner’s behaviour in 
fund management should be advised and developed by PE industry associations in China, 
which may make a contribution to the standardization of legal practice.69 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
The Chinese economy is experiencing a crucial period in which the macro-economic policies 
are shifting from encouraging financial and real estate investment to supporting industry 
economic development. Against this background, it is possible to see this another ‘golden era’ 
of PE in China. The recent legal and regulatory reform of the Chinese PE industry has shown 
                                                 
investment direction of the Privately-raised Fund and its fund category indicated according to the main 
investment direction; (2) The fund contract and the articles of association or partnership agreement of the 
company. The fund prospectus shall also be submitted if it has been provided for investors during fund- 
raising. Where the Privately-raised Fund is established in the form of an enterprise, such as a company or 
partnership, the industrial and commercial registration and photocopies of the original and duplicate of the 
business license shall also be submitted; (3) Where the Privately-raised Fund is placed under entrusted 
management, the agreement on entrusted management shall be submitted. Where the properties of the 
Privately-raised Fund are entrusted to a custodian, the agreement on custody shall also be submitted; and 
(4) Other materials required by the AMAC. 
68 Referred to as ‘LPAs’. 
69 Actually, ever since the establishment of the AMAC in 2012, some professional training programmes have been 
launched in each local and nationwide PE/VC association, the officers of the AMAC are regularly accredited to 
the PE/VC associations at provincial level. Attending a given number of hours of training courses is commonly 
required for each member of those local associations. Moreover, such regular communication may facilitate 
information sharing of the self-regulators and different practitioners of PE and VC market. Such activities will be 
beneficial for developing a series of coherent and widely applicable standards for PE and VC investment in China. 
19  
that the authority is making concerted efforts to build up a collective and more professional 
regulatory regime of PE funds. In reality, however, the tension between different regulatory 
departments (mainly the NDRC and CSRC) has increased the difficulty and costs associated 
with such an institutional transformation. Moreover, a multi-level and weak industry regulatory 
system is also being reshaped in the current wave of reform. However, the collaboration 
between the nation-wide self-regulator (mainly AMAC) and the many local industry 
associations in the PE industry across China is still problematic. This is also closely related to 
the political conflicts between the regulators at the top level of the Chinese bureaucratic system. 
In sum, a more cost-efficient regulatory approach to Chinese PE can be expected, which should 
be an important part of a unified and functionalized regulatory reform of the Chinese financial 
market in the years to come. 
 
 
 
